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Abstract
Health care practices increasingly rely on complex technological in-
frastructure, and new approaches to the integration of information and
communication technology in those practices lead to the development of
such concepts as integrated clinical environments and smart intensive care
units. These concepts refer to hospital settings where therapy relies heav-
ily on inter-operating medical devices, supervised by clinicians assisted by
advanced monitoring and co-ordinating software. In order to ensure safety
and effectiveness of patient care, it is necessary to specify the requirements
of such socio-technical systems in the most rigorous and precise way. This
paper presents an approach to the formalization of system requirements
for communication networks deployed in integrated clinical environment,
based on the higher-order logic language of a theorem-proving environ-
ment, the Prototype Verification System.
1 Introduction
Modern clinical practices involve a large number of medical devices for disparate
functions, such as ventilators, infusion pumps, laser scalpels, or surgical robots,
and a vast array of monitoring and diagnosis devices, from pulse oxymeters to
imaging equipment. Until now, each device usually operates independently of
other devices and is supervised by clinicians, but technological innovations foster
new ways of using medical equipment, which rely on the interconnection of dif-
ferent devices under computer-assisted human supervision. Computer-assisted
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supervision affords many benefits, including the automatization of routine pro-
cedures and, above all, the implementation of safety mechanisms. Further,
computerized management of inter-operating devices can be integrated with in-
formation systems, both local and wide-area, to access and maintain information
on patients and therapies, both at individual and statistical level.
This trend in clinical practices has led clinicians and medical equipment pro-
ducers to formulate such concepts as Integrated Clinical Environment (ICE) [5]
and smart ICU (Intensive Care Unit) [6]. These clinical settings are safety-
critical socio-technical systems whose behavior is determined by complex in-
teractions between people and machines, needing precise and rigorous require-
ments.
In these types of environments, interoperability [13] is a crucial concern.
Interoperability allows a seamless flow of information between many disparate
devices, so that different equipment from different vendors can communicate
over different networks. Existing interoperability standards written for generic
applications must be constrained by imposing the additional requirements of
clinical applications. Such clinical-oriented standards will make it easier to con-
nect future biomedical devices and clinical information system by formulating
a set of interoperability requirements [8, 15].
A central component of an ICE (Fig. 1) is the communication network. In a
typical setting, the network enables communication between many different de-
vices in the hospital area and the ICE supervisor, and possibly among devices.
Sensors for physiological parameters and therapy-delivering devices may be car-
ried on a patient’s body, and signals to and from such equipment are exchanged
with the supervisor and maybe displayed on smartphones. Other equipment
may be operated by clinicians, such as ultrasound scanners, or bar-code readers
used to identify patients and drugs. Further, the local network is connected to
a wider-area network in order to access various information systems, such as
patient databases.
The main contribution of this paper is a theory in a higher-order logic lan-
guage defining requirements for the communication network of an ICE. This
logic specification is a formal reference model for the ICE realization, and for
verification of its properties, in particular of its safety requirements.
An extensive requirements specification for an ICE communication network
is out of the scope of this paper, and only the basic ideas illustrated by short
excerpts are introduced. The specification refers to a network whose nodes are
medical devices and computers, all equipped with wireless network interfaces.
In general, all nodes are mobile and subject to the well known issues of wireless
networks, such as sporadic loss of connectivity. We may observe that wired
devices, if they can be unplugged and moved, are logically equivalent to wireless
ones, otherwise they can be seen as a degenerate case of wireless nodes.
To the authors’ knowledge, no other work on the application of formal logic
to medical systems has appeared in the literature so far. Among works related
to the present paper, the use of the Prolog language to formalize a portion
of the U.S. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [9]
can be cited. Medical processes have been modeled with Guarded High-level
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Message Sequence Charts (g-HMCS) [10], and a knowledge-based distributed
system, K4CARE, is used to support the needs of senior individuals requiring
a personalized home care assistance [3].
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the specification
language of PVS, Section 3 describes the general methodology to formalize the
ICE requirements, Section 4 briefly discusses the high-level communication re-
quirements for an ICE, Section 5 presents the PVS theories for the ICE com-
munication network, in Section 6 the use of these theories for implementation
and verification purposes is discussed, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 The PVS specification language
The typed higher-order logic of the Prototype Verification System (PVS) has
been used for the formal specification of medical devices [7, 12, 11], among
several other kinds of systems. In the PVS, a system is modeled by a theory,
i.e., a set of statements describing the system by means of variable, constant, and
function definitions, and of axioms and theorems about them. In particular, the
language makes it possible for functions to return functions and pass functions
as function arguments. Properties of the system, expressed as theorems, can
then be proved with respect to the theory, using the interactive PVS theorem
prover.
A PVS theory can refer to other theories, thus enabling a modular, hierar-
chical composition of complex systems from subsystems. With the PVS type
system it is possible to use all the datatypes available to programming languages,
but also to define types that abstract from any unnecessary details: It is then
possible to state that the members of a given type satisfy some properties, with-
out any reference to the implementation of the members. Further, subtypes can
be specified by stating the properties which characterize the subtype members.
A PVS extension, the PVSio package [14], adds a prototyping capability to
the PVS environment. This is possible because PVS functions are total and
can be effectively computed when applied to ground, i.e., fully instantiated,
arguments. The PVSio package provides a ground evaluator and a library of
functions with side effects, e.g., reading inputs and producing outputs, thus
allowing a PVS theory to be interpreted and executed, much in the style of
logic programming languages.
The PVS syntax is rather complex, and some details will be given in the text.
Only few rules need to be given in advance: (i) Function types are defined by
signatures, i.e., “[domain → range]”, where the range may be another function
type; (ii) function definitions and applications may be written in Curried form,
i.e., f(x)(y) is syntactically equivalent to f(x, y); (iii) subtypes can be defined
by a clause of the form subtype: TYPE FROM type, or by set comprehension,
e.g., {n : nat | odd(n)}; (iv) formulas labeled as AXIOM are taken by the prover
as proved, while formulas labeled as THEOREM or LEMMA must be proved.
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Figure 1: An Integrated Clinical Environment (adapted from [5]).
3 Formalizing ICE Requirements
The requirements for an ICE span a wide range of issues, from administrative
procedures to device operations. For example, procedures to manage patient
identity data may reduce the risk of delivering a treatment to the wrong pa-
tient, while compliance with safety standards may prevent device failures. The
requirements must take into account such issues as clinician authorizations and
authentication, alarms and warnings, interconnection between ICE and devices,
human-machine interaction, and more. Expressing the requirements in a formal
language results in a large and complex conceptual model that can be checked
for consistency.
The specification process can be structured in two activities, domain iden-
tification and requirements formalization, discussed in the rest of this section.
3.1 Domain identification
Domain identification means recognizing and representing the fundamental con-
cepts in the application domain. The application domain of an ICE is composed
of several (sub)domains, each structured in levels of abstraction.
Using a higher-order logic as a specification language, a domain is modeled
by a theory defining types representing domain concepts, and functions and
axioms representing relationships among concepts. For example, a theory on
patient identification may define the types patient and patient identifier ; the
fact that a patient has an identifier may be expressed by a function id returning
the identifier of a patient, or possibly a set of identifiers, if allowed.
In an earlier work [1], examples of formal requirements were given for the ICE
subdomains of patient identification, physical parameters (such as temperature
or pressure), and devices.
For example, consider the devices subdomain. Its theory depends on the
physical parameters theory, since the state of a device is defined by a set of con-
trolled or observed parameters. A device has a display, which is also represented
as a set of displayed parameters. The front panel, i.e., its external interface, is
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represented abstractly by its display and the set of commands it accepts. The
generic theory for the domain of medical devices includes the definitions for the
above concepts, and functions to access the parts or parameters of a device:
devices_th: THEORY BEGIN
IMPORTING parameters_th
device: TYPE+
state: TYPE = setof[parameter]
command: TYPE+
display: TYPE = setof[parameter]
commands: TYPE = setof[command]
panel: TYPE = [# displ: display,
cmds: commands #]
st(d: device): state
pnl(d: device): panel
...
END devices_th
Note that the TYPE+ keyword asserts that type device is nonempty.
At a lower abstraction level, different types of devices, such as infusion
pumps, are modeled as subtypes of device in the respective theories, which
introduce device-specific commands, parameter, and functions describing state
transitions. The following infusion pumps theory is an example of a device-
specific theory.
infusion_pumps_th: THEORY BEGIN
IMPORTING devices_th
infusion_pump: TYPE+ FROM device
pause_cmd: command
% increment currently edited parm
incr: command
% decrement currently edited parm
decr: command
bolus: command % deliver a bolus
pwr: command % power on/off
...
END infusion_pumps_th
3.2 Requirements formalization
After domain identification, the requirements are specified as a set of axioms,
grouped in theories according to their main subject. It should be noted that a
requirement may involve concepts from different domains.
For example, consider an infusion pump that may be operated remotely
(through the ICE supervisor) or locally (manually). One of its safety require-
ment forbids all local actions while the pump is under remote control, except for
the pause action, so that a clinician may stop drug delivery to stall a perceived
overdose situation. In order to express this requirement, some concepts from
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the interaction theory are needed, such as locally or remotely controlled devices,
locally or remotely issued commands, command instance, and so on:
interactions_th: THEORY BEGIN
IMPORTING devices_th
control: TYPE = {remote, local}
cmd_id: TYPE = posnat
cmd_instance: TYPE =
[# cmd: command, inst: cmd_instance #]
controlled_under(d: device): control
% has cmd_instance i been issued?
issued(i: cmd_instance): bool
% issued locally or remotely?
issued_under(i: cmd_instance): control
enabled(c: command): bool
% does c change a parameter or mode?
changer(c: command): bool
...
END interactions_th
The requirement can then be expressed as Axiom remote disables local :
infusion_pump_reqmts_th: THEORY BEGIN
IMPORTING interactions_th,
infusion_pumps_th
remote_disables_local: AXIOM
forall (p: infusion_pump):
(controlled_under(p) = remote
=> forall (c: command):
(cmds(pnl(p))(c) and changer(c)
and c /= pause_cmd
=> not enabled(c)
and enabled(pause_cmd)))
...
END infusion_pump_reqmts_th
In the above fragment, pnl(p) is the panel of device p, and cmds(pnl(p)) is
the set of commands accepted by p. In PVS, a set is interpreted as a predicate
that is true only for each set member, so the expression cmds(pnl(p))(c)means
that c belongs to the set of commands (cmds(...)) accepted by p. The axiom
then means “for all pumps p, if p is remotely controlled, then all its commands
which change parameter values or operation mode are disabled, except for the
pause command”.
4 Communication-related ICE Requirements
Several system-level ICE requirements induce other requirements on the under-
lying network. Such requirements concern information integrity and availability,
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and system resilience against malfunctions or improper operation. The basic fact
that an ICE is a set of interconnected devices implies that the network must
be dependable. Also specific ICE requirements depend on the availability and
correctness of the network. For example, data on patient conditions must be
available also when the patient is moved to another room. Another important
ICE requirement is that the supervisor must be notified of device disconnections.
A communication theory defines the high-level concepts of communications
between devices and supervisor, such as destination device of a command in-
stance, or issue and reception time of a command instance.
communication_th: THEORY BEGIN
IMPORTING ...
connected(d: device): bool
sent_to(i: cmd_instance,
d: device, t: time): bool
received_by(i: cmd_instance,
d: device, t: time): bool
...
END communication_th
System-level requirements on communication can then be expressed in the
following theory:
communication_reqmts_th: THEORY BEGIN
IMPORTING communication_th
...
cmd_delivery: AXIOM
forall (i: cmd_instance,
d: device, t: time):
connected(d)
and sent_to(i, d, t)
=> exists (tr: time):
received_by(i, d, tr)
and t < tr
once: AXIOM
forall (i: cmd_instance,
d: device, t, t1: time):
received_by(i, d, t)
and received_by(i, d, t1)
=> t1 = t
disconnect_notification: AXIOM
forall (d: device):
not connected(d)
=> disconnect_alarm(d)
END communication_reqmts_th
The first two axioms above concern guarantee of delivery and integrity of
communication: cmd delivery states that every command instance i sent to a
connected device d at time t will be received by d at a later time t1, while once
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states that any command instance i received by a device d is received only once.
Suppose, for example, that the ICE supervisor resets a life-supporting device so
that it can be reprogrammed and then restarted. If the data packet carrying
the reset command is duplicated and resent by a node, the spurious copy could
reach the device after restart and reset it, blocking its life-supporting operation.
The once axiom forbids this kind of hazard.
The third axiom requires that a disconnection notification related to device
d be produced when d is disconnected.
5 The ICE Communication Network
The communication network must be highly reliable and available, but it must
also be flexible and easy to use. In particular, it must enable device mobility,
which allows moving patients and equipment.
The rest of this section sketches a network specification that is general
enough to allow for many different choices of hardware and communication
protocols.
Nodes are the communication interfaces of the medical devices and of the
supervisor, or routing elements. Each device is mapped to one node.
nodes_th: THEORY BEGIN
IMPORTING devices_th
network_size: posnat
node_id: TYPE = below(network_size)
router_id: TYPE = finite_set[node_ids]
device_id: TYPE = finite_set[node_ids]
supervisor: node_id
dev2node_f: TYPE = [device -> node_id]
...
END nodes_th
The network structure is represented as a directed graph, using the digraphs
theory provided by the NASA PVS libraries [2], which is parametric with respect
to the type of graph nodes. In the network graph theory below, topology is the
type of functions from node identifiers to finite sets of node identifiers, meant to
represent physically connected nodes or the set of immediate neighbors of each
node.
Type network graph is the set of directed graphs representing the network
connectivity. The graph has no self-edge.
network_graph_th: THEORY BEGIN
IMPORTING nodes_th, digraphs[node_ids]
topology: TYPE =
[node_ids -> finite_set[node_ids]]
network_graph: TYPE =
{g: digraph[node_ids] |
(FORALL (n: node_ids):
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vert(g)(n))
and (forall (n, m: node_ids):
edges(g)((n, m)) => (n /= m))}
...
END network_graph_th
The packet theory defines packets as records with fields for timestamp, orig-
inating (source) node, sender and destination node, and payload:
packet_th: THEORY BEGIN
IMPORTING nodes_th, time_th
packet: TYPE = [#
timestamp: time,
source_addr: node_id,
sender_addr: node_id,
destination_addr: finite_set[node_id],
payload: finite_sequence[int] #]
END packet_th
The network theory defines the network state as a record with fields for
a global clock, functions mapping each node to its receive buffer and to its
physical location, and a log recording the sequence of packets processed by each
node. Communication primitives, such as forward, handle packets and update
the network state accordingly.
network_th: THEORY BEGIN
IMPORTING time_th, receive_buffer_th,
location_th
network_state: TYPE = [#
global_clock: time,
net_rcv_buf: [node_id -> rcv_buf],
net_location: [node_id -> location] #]
log: [node_id ->
finite_sequence[packet]] #]
forward(p: packet)
(forwarder: node_id)
(net: network_state, g: network_graph):
network_state = ...
...
END network_th
A network protocol is an algorithm executed by each node to propagate
application-specific information. The algorithm updates the network state and
depends on the network structure, as shown in the following theory:
protocol_th: THEORY BEGIN
IMPORTING network_graph_th, network_th
protocol: TYPE =
[network_graph, node_id ->
[network_state -> network_state]]
END network_th
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5.1 Requirements
The requirements of the communication network derive from the higher-level
ICE requirements, i.e., they express the properties that any network implemen-
tation must exhibit in order to be used in an ICE. Consider, for example, the
once axiom in Theory communication reqmts (Sec. 4). In terms of network-
specific concepts, the absence of packet duplication can be expressed as “in
any network state, for all packets p and node n, the set of packets equal to p
transmitted by n is either empty or a singleton”:
comm_netwk_reqmts_th: THEORY BEGIN
IMPORTING ...
no_duplication: AXIOM
FORALL (net: network_state, p: packet):
FORALL (n: node_id):
empty?(transmitted(p, log(net), n) OR
singleton?(transmitted(p, log(net), n)
...
END comm_netwk_reqmts_th
Other types of requirements concern the interaction between devices and
supervisor at a higher abstraction level. For example, in order to express the
disconnect notification system requirement (Sec. 4) as a network requirement,
the following declarations are included in the network theory:
alarm_cause: TYPE = {disconnection, ...}
severity_t: TYPE = {low, medium, high}
disconnected(d: device): bool
alarm(d: device,
c: alarm_cause, s:severity): bool
severity(d: device, c: alarm_cause):
severity_t
The alarm function is true if device d is in the condition described by c,
with severity level s. The latter is obtained by function severity, whose value
depends both on the affected device and on the cause of the alarm.
The following function, from the network theory, checks if node n is dis-
connected, by analyzing the network graph in the current state. The actual
definition of the function will be specified by axioms.
node_disconn(s: network_state,
g: network_graph, n: node_ids):
bool
The following axioms from the comm netwk reqmts theory specify the above
stated disconnect notification requirement:
dev_disconn: AXIOM
FORALL (d: device):
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FORALL (s: network_state):
FORALL (g: network_graph):
node_disconn(s, g, dev2node(d))
=> disconnected(d)
disconn_alarm: AXIOM
FORALL (d: device):
disconnected(d) =>
alarm(d, disconnection,
severity(d, disconnection))
The above discussion shows that PVS language is well suited to specifying
such a complex system as an ICE. The modular composability of PVS the-
ories and the flexibility of the type system make it possible to structure the
overall specification in a set of interrelated theories, each devoted to a specific
(sub)domain or level of abstraction. Such a specification would be easily main-
tainable, in case of changes of regulations or introduction of new equipment or
therapies.
6 Verification
An advantage of the approach used in this work is its ability to describe a
system at different levels of abstraction. A number of different versions of the
theories can be developed for each component, each one at a different level of
detail. The most abstract theories provide the declarations of the basic set of
interface functions (i.e., functions meant to be used in other theories) and types.
More detailed theories can be derived from the abstract definitions by specifying
the definition of the functions and by extending types. If different versions of
a theory provide the same declarations for interface functions and types, they
are interchangeable, hence, when building the model, the minimal set of details
needed for analysis can be used, by importing the appropriate version of the
theory.
For example, consider the high-level definition of the protocol type in Sec-
tion 5.1 above. An instance of that type is a function defining the sequence of
actions performed by a generic node. Actions may depend on the content of
received packets (e.g., the sender address of a received packet) and on the state
of the node (e.g., the value of data gathered from the sensing equipment).
As an example of a concrete protocol specification, let us consider the re-
verse path forwarding protocol [4], a one-to-many algorithm designed to deliver
packets to all nodes in the network. A simple version of this algorithm behaves
as follows: A node n accepts a packet received from node p only if n believes
that p is the best next hop on the path to the base station, as specified in the
routing table. This protocol could be used by the supervisor to query all devices
in order to check if they are all connected.
The following rpf theory contains the definition of the reverse path forward-
ing protocol.
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rpf_th: THEORY BEGIN
IMPORTING ...
...
rpf(g:network_graph, n: node_id)
(net: network_state): network_state =
IF empty?(net_rcv_buf(net)(n))
THEN idle(n)(net, g, rt)
ELSE
LET rcvd_p =
getpacket(net_rcv_buf(net)(n)),
source_addr = source_addr(rcvd_p),
sender_addr = sender_addr(rcvd_p),
next_hop = next_hop(n, bstn)(g, rt)
IN IF sender_addr = next_hop
THEN forward(rcvd_p)(n)(net,g,rt)
ELSE drop(rcvd_p)(n)(net, g, rt)
ENDIF
ENDIF
END rpf_th
Functions idle, forward, and drop are low level single-hop communication
primitives modeling the “no action” behavior, packet forwarding, and packet
dropping, respectively, from the network theory. Function next hop is declared
in a routing table theory (not shown).
Verification is accomplished by producing a formal model of the implemen-
tation to be verified. Then a verification theory can be built, where the axioms
from the requirements theories are expressed as theorems on the implementation
model, as shown in the following schema, where the no duplication requirement
is taken as an example:
implementation_th: THEORY BEGIN
IMPORTING protocol_th, rpf_th ...
init_state: network_state
= (# ... #)
transmitted(p: packet,
l: [node_id -> finite_sequence[packet]],
n: node_id): bool =
% a predicate depending on
% the rpf protocol
END implementation_th
verification_th: THEORY BEGIN
IMPORTING implementation_th ...
no_duplication_thm: THEOREM
FORALL (net: network_state, p: packet):
FORALL (n: node_id):
empty?((transmitted(p, log(net)), n) OR
singleton?((transmitted(p, log(net)), n)
END verification_th
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The implementation theory contains assumptions on the implemented net-
work, including structural and behavioral properties, the definition of, or as-
sumption on, the initial state, and how a packet is transmitted through the rpf
protocol. In the verification theory, it is then possible to prove that the chosen
protocol satisfies the above requirement.
7 Conclusions
The development of ICEs poses many challenges, as they must face the com-
plexity of socio-technical systems and satisfy strict safety requirements. In par-
ticular, rigorous requirements specification is an essential basis for development.
In this paper, an approach to the formalization of system requirements for a
core subsystem of integrated clinical environments, the communication network,
is proposed, elaborating on the guidelines presented in previous work. The
fundamental feature of this approach is the use of a higher-order logic language,
provided by the PVS theorem-proving environment.
The approach has been illustrated by providing and discussing short ex-
cerpts of logical theories describing concepts of, and requirements on, different
aspects of communication networks for clinical environments, at different ab-
straction levels. The examples are meant to support the thesis that logic-based
formal specification is a useful tool in the development of complex, safety-critical
systems, including integrated clinical environments, as it enables developers to
produce modular, detailed, and flexible specifications, which can then be used
for formal verification.
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